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Abstract: This paper examines the ambiguous property rights in China and if they affect the 
private sector development. The indicators for property rights include both broader property 
rights and intellectual property rights. The property rights theory offers a perspective as a 
fundamental component of a market economy to enable a growth of private enterprises. The 
incentives and constraints offered by the property rights regime is determining the outcome 
of how enterprises are performing and operating. Yet in China there has been a rapid 
development of the private sector, while the property rights stay inadequate. The private 
sector which is the dependent variable is measured by employment of private enterprises. The 
sample consists of 275 observations and is conducted cross-provincial with 25 Chinese 
provinces to examine the various contents of property rights regime and the private sector 
development. The data is collected from several Provincial Statistical Yearbooks, available at 
Chinese Statistical Database. A fixed effect model is performed, covering 10 years from 1997 
to 2007. The main finding is that the four municipalities are at forefront driving the effect of 
intellectual property rights on size of the private sector while broader property rights does not 
have an effect. This implies that private firms find intellectual property rights protection 
essential when production is high-tech and innovative activities are prioritised. Other private 
firms find informal substitutions for weaker property rights.  
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1. Introduction 
   Institutional economics have become increasingly popular for numerous studies, due to new 
evidence that variation in economic growth is determined by the institutional setting. The 
definition of institutions by North follows; “Institutions are the rules of the game in a society 
or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” 
(North, 1990 p 3), while an institutional framework composes of fundamental politics, legal 
and social rules which are affecting the production, exchange and distribution (Tan et al, 
2007). Since China introduced a second institutional framework, limited market mechanisms 
to combine with the preservation of the socialist ideology, private firms have quickly 
expanded. The private sector is nowadays contributing to 68 percent of China’s GDP (Nee 
and Opper, 2012). Since 1992, the private sector has been growing at an average rate of 30 
percent. In 2005, there were around 4,30 million private enterprises, employing around 58 
million people (Zheng and Yang, 2009). By 2008, there were around 100 million people 
employed in the private sector. The private sector is contributing to the economic growth in 
China with nonfarm-employment, profits and increasing incomes and taxes (Nee and Opper, 
2012). Yet this combined dual-track system of two institutional frameworks has generated 
new opportunities of rent-seeking and higher transactions costs. As the property rights theory 
argues, well-established property rights are fundamental for private firm development as 
private owners responds to market incentives by increase productive investments to gain 
profits. On other hand, weakly protected property rights raise transaction costs when 
uncertainty increases among investors, resulting with decreased investments. Property rights 
are expected to define growth, yet the private sector has been expanding without operating in 
a market economy (Bardhan, 1997; Pejovich, 1999). 
The expectations of an efficient legal system to be essential for private firms are dismantled 
by China (Lerner et al, 2016). Does an efficient legal system not matter for private firm 
development? The constitution in China was amended in 2004, where it modified the right to 
own and inherit private property. But the state allows itself to expropriate or acknowledge 
ownership of the property for public use with compensation. The central government shall 
support, encourage and guide the non-state sector (2004 P.R.C Laws article 22 cited in Zhang 
2014). Inadequate property rights expressed in this way enables breed of corruption and 
vulnerability of unauthorised inference for entrepreneurs leading to a loss of long-term 
investments. Formal contracts are not reliable and even less reliable over a long term in an 
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unpredicted environment, which is a very harsh business environment for smaller private 
firms which are crucial for any transition economy (Bardhan, 1997; Roxas et al, 2008). 
Moreover, the fiscal and administrative decentralisation has resulted in a mixed provincial 
environment whereas property rights regime differs too. China therefore, lends itself an 
analysis of local institutions role on the private firm development. In addition, the central 
government decided to introduce and allow marketisation of a higher degree in chosen parts 
along the coastal area (Zeng, 2011). This introduced a variety of incentives and constraints 
across China as local governments have different attitudes towards developing and granting 
private-owned enterprises resources. Few local governments are more benevolent to 
entrepreneurs than others, the preconditions for private firms are suffering of high inequality 
(Roxas et al, 2008). Resulting with several provinces which enjoy rapid improvement of 
property rights protection while others are barely making any progress (Croix and Konan, 
2002). China is therefore an interesting case study, to examine if the private sector is 
expanding in provinces with stronger property rights and if the property rights theory is 
consistent even with the context of China. 
1.1 Aim and Research Questions 
   The aim of this thesis is to examine the correlation between size of the private sector and 
property rights, both physical and intellectual property rights, at provincial level of China. As 
to analyse to what extent do property rights matter for an expanding private sector within 
China’s provinces. Recent studies have shifted focus of property rights economics to explain 
firm performance but this thesis wish to highlight property rights on the size of private sector 
(Eicher and Newiak, 2013). Other studies highlight the importance of informal institutions as 
determining growth of firm’s operations within transition economies (Steer and Sen, 2010). 
Yet, this paper wishes to examine the role of formal institutions which ought to be 
determining the long-run outcomes for private firm development. A cross-provincial study is 
a good basis for testing the property rights theory and bring more perspective to the puzzle of 
property rights importance for determining expansion of the Chinese private-enterprise 
system. Therefore, the research questions are formulated as below;  
1. Does a larger private sector exist within provinces providing stronger property rights? 
2. Are intellectual property rights essential for China’s expanding private sector?  
The first question addresses the issue of correlation between broader property rights and the 
size of private sector, as apart from the property rights theory, previous empirical evidence 
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conclude that the private sector has been developing more than property rights. The opinions 
vary of how defective the governance of property rights is. To further analyse the effect of 
ambiguous property rights, the details of existing regulations must be examined further as to 
analyse which parts are functioning better and which not, to reveal if any component is less 
important. This leads to include the second component, intellectual property rights. The 
second question fulfils the aim of examining specifically the role of intellectual property 
rights to China’s private sector. The definitions and further perspectives of physical and 
intellectual property rights will be discussed in the next chapter.  
 1.2 Method and Limitations 
   A statistical analysis in form of a Panel data over time will form this thesis. The model will 
be based on primary Chinese data, compiled from Chinese Provincial Yearbooks (1998-
2008). The panel data will cover 10 years from 1997 to 2007 because of the property rights 
data available. Further, several variables collected from Provincial Statistical Yearbooks 
suffer from divergent reporting and therefore limits the time frame for a panel data. In 
addition, this results in leaving six provinces and conclude a model with 25 Chinese 
provinces. Even though the time covered is short, the advantages of panel data are superior to 
cross-sectional data as panel data will capture both time and individual effects. In this case, 
the Chinese provinces have various individual characteristics which visualises the effect of 
institutional changes (Verbeek, 2004; Hsiao, 2003). A coverage of 10 years ought to be 
sufficient to capture the progress of property rights protection on the development of the 
private sector. As the private sector had its peak years during the years covered up to year of 
2007 (Lerner et al, 2016). Since China’s provinces are highly diverse, in subjects of 
economic development, policies and various institutional settings it is necessary to estimate 
the model at provincial levels. The provinces have adopted different attitudes towards market 
mechanism, such as private-owned enterprises and property rights. Therefore, the provincial 
data will be collected from Provincial Yearbooks as they report most thorough data. The 
provincial data is collected by several governmental institutions, both on national and lower 
level governments and various enterprises. A data collection from several resources increases 
the credibility as manipulation become rather difficult compared to one sole source. 
Due to the limited coverage of property rights indexes, this thesis will not be able to measure 
the effect of the property rights law which was enacted 2007. Still, the constitution was 
amended in 2004 with an increased protection of private property rights. Moreover, the time 
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scope is covering several laws and amendments of intellectual property rights which were 
implemented around the millennium (Croix and Konan, 2002).  
1.3 Outline 
   The second chapter covers theoretical framework and evaluation of previous literature. The 
chapter will first highlight the property rights theory before moving further to the details of 
developing and governing property rights in China. Starting with broader property rights 
followed by intellectual property rights. Chapter three consists of methodology and data 
description of the model and motivation for the selected variables. This is followed by 
descriptive statistics and the econometric approach with transformation of variables before 
regressing the final models. Chapter four provides the result of the panel data model and 
concludes with robustness checks outlined in more detail for each approach. Chapter five 
ends with conclusions of this thesis. 
2.Theoretical Framework 
2. 1 Theory  
   Property rights are essential for market economies to solve conflicts of scarce resources 
among individuals. Property rights specify the rights to use a resource, consisting of four 
fundamental rights. Rights for the owner are following; to use the economic good, to take 
decisions regarding the property, the right to handle profits and losses of the property and the 
right to rent or sell it further to another party. Well-established property rights will by its own 
nature solve possible conflicts of resource competition, as one resource cannot be used 
simultaneously. However, an individual may not have all the rights of the resources. For 
example, in China, the real estate may be privately owned while the land underneath belongs 
to the state. This address one of the crucial issues with the absence of clear property rights, 
when it deals with private and public sectors where the bundle of rights may be shared. 
Another form of property rights is communal rights, where neither the state nor individuals 
have the right to exclude another part from using the good. For example, a park or public 
roads are all public used without anyone having the right to exclude a person. The issue of 
communal rights occurs when the resource needs to be taken care of, and no clear owner is 
present to be in charge, for example the common issue of pollution. The structure of property 
rights and how well it defines the owner results in to what degree an owner responds to 
political or market incentives. For example, private firms are more likely to respond to 
market incentives if enjoying private property rights compared to state-owned enterprises 
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(Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). Private property rights will allow owners of firms to retain all 
earnings and gain incentives for profit maximisation. Clear property rights will channel 
resources towards productive investments. It is therefore a powerful mechanism to either be 
used for defining growth or to impede development as the structure of property rights impacts 
the value of resources (Fennell, 2013). Therefore, property rights affect resource allocation 
and economic efficiency. 
An absence of well-defined property rights in China, increases transaction costs because of 
legal difficulties. Transaction costs cover informational, legal and communication costs and it 
is the extra cost of market imperfection when exchanging a good between two parties. For 
example, less transparency increases search costs and in combination with bureaucracy, it 
increases communication cost. Further, legal difficulties increase costs of contracts. In the 
case of China, it is therefore costlier to try to secure and protect property rights. With legal 
difficulties present, incentives for inducing informal exchanges between actors will rise with 
induced risk of forming contracts. If property rights do not clearly define the owner, the 
private property with rights to exclude others, receives unrestricted access (Feder and Feeny, 
1991). Incentives for investments in innovation decreases as soon there is a risk for 
expropriation. It may decrease potential of high-tech production as expropriation is a constant 
potential threat from the government or other observant individuals. Therefore, a weak 
protected property rights regime will reduce possibilities for productive investments and 
restrain private firm development. The institutional setting of property rights is therefore 
affecting firm’s behaviour and decisions (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). Moreover, as scarcity 
of resources increases, it demands an improving protection of private property. Some factors, 
such as population density and high technology development increases the benefits of 
protecting private property, as it reveals opportunities for profits. If this is beneficial for 
national governments, the formal institutions of property rights will improve (Feder and 
Feeny, 1991). For instance, as technology advancement increases in China, protection of 
broader and intellectual property rights becomes more significant.  
If right preconditions are set, not only will privatisation grow but a competitive market leaves 
innovative firms to survive. A study conducted of 500 largest manufacturing industries across 
the world, finds that mixed enterprises perform worst and hints the conflict of shared public 
and private ownership. Private firms are significant improving profitability’s as they are 
enjoying market incentives compared to state-owned enterprises. Concluding, the private 
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sector is a vital component within an economy and is dependent on a good protection of 
property rights (Boardman and Vining, 1989).  
2.2 Broader Property rights in China 
   Several contributions to the property rights theory do not only point out a complete content 
of rule of law but likewise, the governance of property rights is vital. For example, Russia has 
an independent judiciary and stronger property rights than China, yet investors in China rate 
the institutional environment higher than Russia during the 90’s, based on self-perception 
when investors were asked how safe they feel about their investments (Rodrik, 2004). The 
sense of security feeds from various norms in the Chinese economy, such as co-operations 
with informal ties or with local governments to receive protection (Huang et al, 2017). These 
norms are being shaped as the property rights in China are gradually changing, from not 
being granted at all to entrepreneurs, to be weakly protected. The aim of the amended 
property rights in 2004 was to increase protection of property rights, but the practice still has 
its exceptions. One example is the situation of land rights. Land is owned by government and 
there is no private ownership. Individuals have only the right to use the land and draw 
benefits by paying the government a certain yearly fee, to keep using the land. The insecurity 
is the limit of how long the land-use right will be allowed. As for real estate, individuals have 
the right of private ownership and to sell, exchange or give it away as a gift of the property. 
The land-use rights will shift with the exchange from one party to the other, yet the land still 
belongs to the government. The buyer receives the land-use right for a period, as original 
assigned to the first party and by law it remains unclear whether the new party may receive a 
renewal of time for usage or whether there will be certain fees to pay. The automatic renewal 
of time and conditions for fees was accounted first within the property rights law of 2007 
(Zhang, 2014). Another example of diffused property rights in practice, are the township- and 
village enterprises, which had both private entrepreneurs and local governments claiming 
property rights of it (Nee 1992). Entrepreneurs shared their profits and the local government 
officials did not have any motivation to expropriate their business as their growth led to 
increased profits. With clear private property rights, the small firms would not have to co-
operate with the local governments to avoid expropriation. As the private sector and 
economic development has been growing in spite of the property rights in China, there are 
fewer incentives present to hurry up with reforming it (Aron, 2000; Huang et al, 2017). 
Property rights is gradually changing, in combination with the “Opening door” policy from 
1978, the discrimination towards private enterprises slightly decreased by the introduction of 
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market mechanisms and the growth of private sector was initiated (Nee and Opper, 2012). 
Yet, the private enterprises are still lacking access to resources as they are monopolised by 
the governments. The governments keep control of the economic activity by, either co-
operating or expropriate the firms as it fits. This power tool is used by the central government 
to be able to control the resource allocation. The governments maintain control of deciding 
the following; licenses, firm structures, major operations and decisions of the firm, prospects 
for future operations, profit distribution and the business domain (Tan et al, 2007). These 
factors raise the legal difficulties for the Chinese private enterprises.  
The property rights are not only weak in China, but are unequal across provinces and 
intensifies a high inequality among regions. The coastal area and urban cities have attracted 
far more investments. The Eastern provinces are enjoying higher economic growth and a 
more developed private sector (Zhu and Lin, 2007). One main factor for the uneven 
distribution of private firms is the decentralisation. China implemented fiscal and 
administrative decentralisation, consisting of many levels such as; central, provincial, 
prefectural/cities, county, township and village level of government. The central government 
has different attitudes for allowing privatisation and a clear division can be seen comparing 
West and East China. The non-state sector is larger in coastal provinces, while the Western 
provinces keep a substantial proportion of state-owned enterprises. In practice, different 
demands have been set by the central government by requiring different development 
achievements for local governments. For example, local governments in Eastern China have 
incentives for helping smaller private firms to grow and as so, they do not impede 
marketisation. Contrary, the Western provinces respond less to market incentives since the 
central government wish to keep many state-owned enterprises located there. The 
decentralisation has brought up a disparity of regional activities and outcomes as property 
rights institutions vary, for example, investments in science and innovations are clustered 
(Zhu and Lin, 2007). A study conducted by Song (2009) has found correlation between 
property rights in China and increasing investments, for example of R&D expenditures. This 
evidence is based on a study conducted on 18 cities across China with various levels of 
property rights protection. Property rights are measured by self-perception of entrepreneurs. 
Yet a study only covering cities may be questionable as China does already invest more on 
urban development. They further report that the private sector does rely on written contracts 
but not on help from courts in case of disputes where property rights protection is in conflict. 
This implies that even in a transition economy, entrepreneurs will continue to prefer a formal 
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contract and thus demand an increasing legal protection. It has additionally found that 
protection of property rights is still important even for smaller firms across China and that 
broader property rights are still crucial as an additional complement to the protection of 
intellectual property rights consisting of; patents, copyrights, trademarks and design (Song et 
al, 2009). A recent firm-level study, from the years of 1998 to 2008, concludes that property 
rights indeed causes firms to survive, as regions which enhance property rights decreases the 
probability of exit. Reasons are, either less government intervention or improved laws and 
market intermediates (Shi et al, 2017). 
Several studies confirm that sub-national institutions, by the delegation of economic power to 
lower level governments, have had positive effects on stimulating privatisation because of 
new incentives for achieving economic development (Tse et al, 2006; Tan et al, 2007). 
Montinola, Qian and Weingast (1995) referred to this as “Federalism, Chinese style”. The 
central government received a limited interventionist role and sub-national governments 
received more impact of their regions. By keeping the national government out, the provinces 
are limiting distortions and rent-seeking from the central government. This has ensured an 
improved stability for economic activities within the province. However, the more developed 
regions have enjoyed better conditions to reach economic growth by stronger property rights 
while other poorer regions have not had efficient local governments (Montinola et al, 1995). 
The higher performed regions are attracting entrepreneurs to locate their firms there and it is 
an ongoing cycle. A province which already enjoys an expanding private sector by providing 
protection of property rights is further attracting new start-ups and keep improving their 
protection of property rights. Though these studies report different outcomes of private firms 
depending on institutional settings, they do not specify if property rights are any more 
necessary in few locations than others. Rather they conclude the importance of property 
rights in whole China (Tse et al, 2006; Song et al, 2009; Tan et al, 2007). Further, the 
previous empirical evidence stays rather inconclusive, whether property rights affect 
development or if economic growth leads to an increasing protection of property rights 
(Eicher and Newiak, 2013; Maskus, 2000).  
The decentralisation has brought up competition among provinces. To attract production 
factors, skilled labour and foreign capital, local governments compete by providing and 
develop infrastructure and access to markets. It creates an internal demand for improved 
protection of property rights to enhance investments and further economic development. This 
is evidently for benevolent governments in more developed provinces while other provincial 
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governments enjoy incentives of rent-seeking (Montinola et al, 1995). But even with well-
defined property rights, protecting property rights is an ongoing progress and is rather viewed 
as an evolutionary process constantly shaped by market and social movements enforced by 
the state (Rapaczynski, 1996; Milhaupt, 1998). However, several researchers conclude that 
property rights are still not sufficiently secured and the gradual change is slow (Montinola et 
al, 1995; Zhang and Bruun, 2017). Yet the role of independence for the firms is assumed to 
be a minor or larger obstacle depending on provincial location. As even with benevolent 
governments, the private firms are not in power to claim private property rights. Still the 
fundamental decisiveness enforced property rights have on the private sector, ought to hold 
which leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1: “Property rights are positively correlated with employment in the private sector.” 
The first hypothesis wishes to imply that formal institutions are determining the size of 
private sector, even if informal institutions may be complementary for private firms in 
transition economies (Steer and Sen, 2010). With stronger property rights, Chinese firms 
increase their probability to survive and the employment is more sustainable (Shi et al, 2017).  
2.3 Intellectual Property Rights in China 
   The competition among firms today is the knowledge they obtain, for example; 
management practices, technology innovations and business strategies. With global 
competition and the information revolution it is more imperative than ever to protect 
intellectual property rights. Intellectual property rights, IPR, are the rights to use and sell 
knowledge and inventions. It consists of four main categories such as; patents, copyright, 
trademarks and design. IPR is a tool for increasing innovation as there is a reward for 
companies which initiate an innovation. Protected from theft of innovation, the company 
receives monopoly rights for their innovation, which is the main advantage. Grasping market 
shares by keeping up with innovative activities induces incentives for investments. Without 
protecting intellectual property rights, goods will be classified as public goods, to be non-
rival and allow usage for anyone. Consequently, incentives for innovation decreases and 
purposely delays of production choices or scientific publications may occur, which introduces 
inefficiency of knowledge improvement within the economy (Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2007).  
Regional variation of IPR regimes is evidently as well. Eastern provinces enjoy better 
protection than their Western counterparts. A recent contribution, revalued if improved 
property rights have an effect for Chinese private firms. The study conducted patent data 
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before and after major IPR laws were implemented. They argue that Chinese firms do not 
immediately respond to shifts of IPR regimes, as their experience of ambiguous institutions 
have led to greater reliance on informal practices (Huang et al, 2017). The ambiguous IPR 
institutions feeds from inefficient policies and definitions. For example, the levels of 
protection do not match the rapid industrial development. The laws implemented at early 
stage, were basic and left room for courts to use their own interpretation. The infringements 
on companies’ brands and technology have proceeded and the government has not taken 
effective measures to protect companies. The firms exposed to infringements are from 
various industries. The trust for IPR protections are low from many different parties (Zhang 
and Bruun, 2017). It takes time after an improvement of IPR protection for Chinese private 
firms to be even more likely to respond to a formal institution instead (Huang et al, 2017). 
When the legal system is not enough, other alternatives are possible. An in-depth study 
collected interviews from foreign firms in China to examine how firms try to protect 
themselves when IPR protection is paradox. The interviews conclude that firms adopt 
strategies to raise the barriers of imitation, such as making the process of the product or 
service provided more complex, which would take time and be costly to imitate. Other 
strategies involve educating the staff the importance of protecting IPR for the firm, or build 
up networks internal and external as to have informal protection in case of dispute, for 
example having a good relationship to the local government (Keupp et al, 2010). Moreover, 
the ambiguous institutions lead to uncertainty and decreased transparency which is harsh on 
smaller firms. The smaller private firms are suspected to not have much information about 
the IPR system or even if they acquire a patent, they may not have resources to further 
commercialise the innovation. In a case of dispute, they are neither believed to have the 
capacity or trust the courts for solving disputes (Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2007).  
Several papers have thereupon studied the protection of IPR in more detail to break down the 
puzzle of combatting ambiguous intellectual property rights. Researcher, agrees that return to 
patents, trademarks and copyrights may have different outcomes and opens the possibility of 
conclusion that they may not be equally important. Studies of IPR extended towards the 
developing world, analysing 54 countries, shows protection of IPR, particularly patent 
protection, is positively correlated with economic development but where the degree of IPR 
enforcement is the determining factor (Eicher and Newiak, 2013). A study conducted by Fai 
(2005) confirms that foreign investors in China perceive that infringement on patents is lower 
than it is for copyright or trademarks. Patents are granting commercialisation of the 
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innovation and allows to extract economic rents from the innovation. If successful, it may be 
one of the most rewarding advices (Keupp et al, 2010). Another paper, reports as well that 
infringements of intellectual property rights have been more severe on copyrights, 
specifically software piracy (Kshetri, 2009). Requiring a patent is a long and costly process 
and is therefore the most competitive advice as it is signalling innovative skills of a company. 
The company has already a first-move advantage at the market and can improve the quality 
of the product. Therefore, patent protection is of a higher value for private firms. Returns to 
trademarks are evident too as it helps solving information asymmetry between a seller and a 
buyer and may as well imply good signalling of a reputable company, while copyright is a 
right that is automatically rewarded to the author (Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2007).  
Yet the reports from the same authors discusses that lower protection of IPR, for example 
copyrights, may be beneficial as it enables low-cost imitation of production, implying that 
infringements of copyrights do not necessarily have negative effects (Greenhalgh and Rogers, 
2007). As China has been an importer of technology for decades, it has sparked new 
opportunities for Chinese entrepreneurs to adapt the western technology and develop further 
ideas. But as China becomes more innovative, it will require more robust institutions as a 
study concludes, that informal norms completing the inefficient legal system have a limit. 
Innovation, measured by patent stocks, is shown to be higher in regions with higher IPR 
protection. The protection of IPR has yet to improve if China wishes to move further from 
investment-led growth to increase domestic production and innovations (Lerner et al, 2016). 
The Chinese private sector is already more innovating than the state-owned sector and China 
has potential to shift further to a more innovative economy if intellectual property rights keep 
improving (Wei et al, 2016). Moreover, the study by Eicher and Newiak (2013) reports that 
both dimensions of physical and intellectual property rights have equally determining power 
on economic development. But if protection of property rights is not developing it has no 
effect on the development, implying that only an increase of protection of the property rights 
regime, will have positive externalities towards economic growth or marketisation. This is 
concluded while addressing the possible endogeneity issue of reversed causality by using an 
instrument variable for IPR. 
Moving towards the practice of IPR, China has joined many international conventions of IPR 
since 1980, but relished a slow progress. A new trademark and copyright law was enforced in 
2000 to meet the agreements of TRIPS standard, trade-related aspects of intellectual property 
rights, while the Patent law was amended during the same time to meet WTO standards. 
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Moreover, the Patent Law has been the most successful enforced among the various 
components of intellectual property rights, such as the copyright regulations. With the 
“Opening door policy”, China enacted a Patent Law early as 1984 to promote science and 
encourage innovations (Zhang, N. 1997). Promoting science and innovations are not in 
conflict with any political constraints and seems to be a reason for why the Patent Law is 
better enforced than for example copyright or trademark regulations, which induces capacity 
for mimicking and censorship by the central government as it is weakly protected (Zhang, N. 
1997). The increase of patent applications rose from 80,000 in 1995 to over 120,000 in 1998 
and R&D expenditures as a share of GDP doubled during 1995-2005. Especially the number 
of patents are highly uneven distributed, whereas the coastal provinces are granted major of 
patents, showing that patents are very clustered in China (Sun, 2000). Higher number of 
produced patents are correlated with increasing economic activity and information about 
increasing patent stocks attract firm’s decision for location. In turn, a growth of firms may 
increase number of applied patents (Kshetri, 2009; Fai, 2005). Further, China has 
implemented specialised IPR courts in few provinces to raise competence of specialised 
judges within conflicts of IPR (Croix and Konan, 2002). However, these courts are placed in 
more developed provinces such as; Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangsu 
and Hainan. The location of the courts is based where more disputes occur. To illustrate the 
importance of implementing specialised courts, between the years of 1991-1995, there were 
in total 15’543 lawsuits where 96 percent received a final judgement (Zhang, N. 1997).  
Thus, a broader increase of IPR protection is not only encouraging innovation and 
competition, but clearly is a tool for decreasing information asymmetry which further would 
decrease transaction costs. Concluding that protection of intellectual property rights is 
crucial, as laws of IPR were enforced in an early stage of market reforms. Leading to the 
second hypothesis: 
H2: “Increasing protection of IPR is correlated with employment within the private sector.” 
The second hypothesis is based on previous research, but also the empirical evidence of the 
gradual process China has taken forward to improve the protection of IPR. It is clearly a 
progress ongoing and the demand both from domestic entrepreneurs and international 
partners are pushing for an improvement, specifically over the years covered in this thesis. 
This should hint that protection of IPR is vital for entrepreneurial activities and the private 
sector. 
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3. Methodology 
3. 1 Data 
   The data is retrieved and compiled from several editions of Chinese National and Provincial 
Yearbooks. The Chinese Yearbooks are published yearly and are usually containing 24 
chapters, covering national accounts such as GDP to more detailed statistics of contract 
disputes solved by courts. Most of the data is based on provincial yearbooks which provides 
more details of the province such as number of lawyers. On the other hand, the provincial 
yearbooks differ somewhat from each other, for example some provinces are better at 
reporting consistently over the years. Because of shortage of data on lawyer counts the 
following provinces are excluded; Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Hainan, Xizang, Shaanxi and 
Gansu, leaving 25 provinces out of 311. The restrain on years covered and the choice of 
dropping six provinces results in a balanced panel data. Therefore, the panel data is a 
balanced panel data with no missing observations. All panels (provinces) contain exact same 
time periods for each variable. A balanced panel data is more efficient as it accounts for 
individual heterogeneity which is obvious for this cross-provincial study and therefore 
decreases the risk of noise, compared to using an incomplete panel data (Verbeek, 2004). 
The control variables are carefully chosen fitting the Chinese context. To measure property 
rights on private firm development as accurate as possible, it is necessary to account for the 
various regional differences as well as other disadvantages the private sector suffers from 
which may have an impact on the regional distribution. The disadvantages are access to 
financial institutions, access to infrastructure, access to lawyers, access to human capital and 
access to technology advancement (Zhu and Lin, 2007). Studies of transition economies 
cover several important indicators to measure distribution of firm growth and influences on 
the business environment, such as financial institutions, legal framework, human capital, 
technology advancement, infrastructure as well as economic development (Brown et al, 
2005).  
                                                          
1 Provinces included: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, 
Guangdong, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang.  
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3.2 Variables 
3.2.1 Dependent Variable 
   The dependent variable measures number of Employed Persons in Private Enterprises and 
Self-employed persons. The private enterprises are defined as economic units owned by 
private persons. Included in this category are following; private limited liability corporations, 
private share-holding corporations Limited, private partnership enterprises and private-
funded enterprises registered in accordance with the Corporation Law, Partnership 
Enterprises Law and Interim Regulations on Private Enterprises. The employed person must 
be aged 16 and earn monetary benefit for the employment. This variable will be derived per 
10 000 capita and it will present the distribution of the private sector by looking at how many 
are employed within the private sector. This measure was more consistently reported than 
number of private firms and in addition, the number of employed people estimates directly 
the proportion of the population working for a private enterprise. Contrary, number of private 
enterprises may be few but larger private enterprises in a province or many but smaller 
private enterprises which is not as specific (China Statistical Yearbook).  
3.2.2 Main Independent Variables 
   The property rights variables are collected from NERI Index of Marketization of China’s 
Provinces 2009 Report (Chinese Edition). The NERI, National Economic Research Institute, 
indexes measure the progress of institutional transformation of China’s provinces. It covers 
five main topics; the relationship between the government and the market, the development 
of the non-state sector, the development of the markets, the development of market 
intermediaries, and the legal environment (Gang and Fan, 2009). The index for broader 
property rights is on a scale from 1-10 and is based on 23 indicators of institutional 
arrangements of the five major fields mentioned. The indicators are collected from statistics 
or enterprise and household’s surveys to show a relative comparison across the provinces. It 
is not to be interpreted as any ideal of state to score 10, as no market economy is fully 
operating without market failures and continuous progress of marketisation. The larger value 
of the property rights, the stronger is the property rights regime. The property rights indexes 
are already adjusted for respectively size of GDP on provincial level and are weighted 
equally. As China experienced rapid shifts of negative and positive development, some 
provinces may take a value below 0 or above 10 to illustrate the progress (Wang et al, 2007). 
This thesis covers both broader property rights and intellectual property rights indexes. Both 
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property rights indexes will be derived in lagged values to account for path dependence since 
institutions take time to reform (Williamson, 2000). 
(1) Property Rights  
Broader property rights measure the development of the five major fields. By the NERI index 
it is calculated as;     
Figure. 1 
Vi- Vmin 
Sij=  ------------- x 10 
   Vmax-Vmin 
 
Figure 1 is retrieved from (Wang et al, 2007). Sij is the province of interest. Vi is the current 
value of province i examined. V-min is the minimum base year value which is 1997 of the 
province i and Vmax is the maximum value of the province with highest score that year. 
(2) Intellectual Property Rights 
This index measures average of two factors to measure the degree of legal protection for 
innovation and intellectual property rights. The two factors calculated are average of the 
number of patents application divided by the number of science and technology personnel 
and number of patents granted divided by the number of science and technology personnel 
(Wang et al, 2007).  
3.2.3 Control Variables 
Lawyers 
The legal situation suffers of high disparity among the provinces where some enjoy a more 
pronounced legal structure than other provinces. To control for the legal situation a proxy 
ought to be number of lawyers. A legal system is necessary to define property rights and 
lawyers serve the role as market intermediaries (Williamson, 2000). Provinces which keep 
provide improved protection of IPR, prepares Chinese private firms to be more likely to 
respond to IPR regulations. Over time, firms rely more on the quality of formal institutions 
(Huang et al, 2017). A stronger legal framework might imply an increasing demand for 
lawyers. The variable measure total lawyers for each province respectively, both part-time 
lawyers and full-time lawyers are combined. Because of inconsistency, it is not possible to 
measure them separately cross-provincial (China Provincial Yearbook, 2008). Lawyers will 
be measured per 10 000 capita to account for size of the provinces. 
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Total Loans in Financial Institutions 
As mentioned before, financial constraint ought to be one of the greater effect on smaller 
private enterprises within transition economies (Brown, Earle and Lup, 2005). Within the 
Chinese context this may be an important control variable if the survival of smaller firms is 
depending on access to financial markets. It is not possible to accurately measure the amount 
of total loans from financial institutions to private enterprises however, this variable may 
present indirectly how much capacity financial markets operate within each province. The 
imperfections of financial markets are crucial in China as the central government controls for 
resource allocation and which industries of interest should survive the markets (Poncet et al, 
2010). It is therefore interesting to examine if the proportion of formal financial institutions 
may have an indirect effect of the distribution of the private sector (McPherson and Rous, 
2010). To measure the credit capacity of formal financial institutions in each province this 
control variable will be derived per 10 000 capita, in million Yuan each year, covering loans 
to industrial, agriculture and commercial enterprises plus fixed assets. This might provide an 
impression of how large financial institutions are in each province (China Yearly Provincial 
Macro-Economic Statistics). 
Technology 
Innovations are highly correlated with regional development, as patent stocks are higher in 
more developed provinces. In China, it is the private firms which innovate more than state-
owned firms (Lerner et al, 2016). It is relevant to measure technology and control for it since 
technology ought to improve faster with a more innovative private sector. However, the 
technology gap across regions is one main factor explaining the different rates of 
development. Measurement of technology advancement has typically two approaches. It is 
either measured through number of patents, viewed as the output of the technology or it 
measures R&D institutions as input to technology development (Fai, 2005). Due to the 
inconsistency of R&D institutions, this thesis will measure total patents granted per 10 000 
capita in each province respectively. The patents cover 3 subcategories; inventions, utility 
model and design. Inventions are defined as new technical proposals to method or to the 
product or both. Utility models are proposals on structure or shape of the product or 
combined. Design is defined as new designs applied to the industry’s products such as colour, 
shape or structure. These three categories are also ranked whereas the first mentioned is the 
most beneficial for regional development as inventions are sustainable for long-term 
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development while designs only have effects lasting for short-term (China Statistical 
Yearbook on Science and Technology, 2008). 
GDP 
Economic development may determine prospects of business environment or the output of 
investments. China suffers from high regional inequality whereas the coastal area is more 
prosperous and attracts more investments and entrepreneurs, which further leads to economic 
development (Zhu and Lin, 2007). The differences of economic development across 
provinces might as well give an indication of how many policies, institutions and speed of 
market reforms have taken place and how successful they might have been (Fan et al, 2001). 
Since the private sector in China has led to economic development it may be correlated with 
the size of private sector as well. This variable will be derived per 10 000 capita and is 
measured in million Yuan yearly (China Yearly Provincial Macro-Economic Statistics). 
Human Capital 
Human capital is a vital investment and determinant for sustainable economic growth. 
Increasing human capital of educational levels, explains a higher increase of investments in 
innovative activities (Romer, 1990). The measure of human capital is student enrolment of 
higher education. It does not present how many graduates but reveals the capability of 
universities. However, private enterprises have been competing with state-owned enterprises 
for human capital without a fair competition, implying that private enterprises most likely 
possess modest educational background, such as secondary school graduates (McPherson and 
Rous, 2010; Opper and Nee, 2012). This variable will measure the higher education of human 
capital due to the positive externalities, for example innovation and technology advancement, 
which affects the whole society. Human capital will also be derived per 10 000 capita (China 
Yearly Provincial Macro-Economic Statistics). 
Freight Traffic 
Infrastructure, more precisely water and land transportation, is correlated with regional 
economic development in China. Regions have various priorities for investments on 
infrastructure (Wang Q, et al, 2011). Transportation infrastructure is a good prerequisite for 
firms to expand operations and thus improves market exchanges between buyers and sellers. 
Thus, it may be correlated with size of the private sector as good infrastructure attracts 
investments. Likewise, it is relevant to control for infrastructure since it is a key determinant 
for factor mobility and ought to be more used in more developed regions with a higher 
20 
 
economic activity (Qian et al, 2012). Moreover, private enterprises might still be 
discriminated from accessing public infrastructure for private transportation and therefore is 
interesting to control for. The freight traffic will be measured per 10 000 capita as a larger 
population ought to have a larger volume of freight traffic for use. This variable covers 
railroads, highways and waterways combined in number of tons. The effect of specific 
transportation is not essential (China Yearly Provincial Macro-Economic Statistics). 
State-owned enterprises 
During the transition, the central government decided to allow few provinces more 
marketisation whilst other provinces keep a higher proportion of state-sector. Even if the 
state-owned enterprises are unviable firms, the central government chose to protect some 
industries of interest. Further implying there may be provinces sustaining more of the state-
sector whilst other regions are experimenting with a non-state sector. The regions with a 
higher share of non-state sector are assumed to enjoy better property rights protection (Lin, 
2013; Zeng, 2011). As regions become more competitive towards each other, the interest of 
increasing the private sector and protect property rights is induced and motivated (Tse et al, 
2006). The variable measures amount of state-owned enterprises in each province and will be 
derived per 10 000 capita. As so, controlling for number of state-owned enterprises will sort 
out provinces enjoying allowance with experiencing marketisation (China Yearly Provincial 
Macro-Economic Statistics). 
3. 3 Econometric testing 
   The panel data will cover 25 provinces over a 10 years period. Panel data have several 
advantages, it allows for more data observations and thus increases the degrees of freedom, it 
decreases the risk of multicollinearity among the variables and therefore it results in more 
efficient estimators. Estimating a cross-provincial panel data with fixed effects allows to 
account for unobserved individual heterogeneity, provincial-specific characteristics, that may 
not already be included in the model. Every province is therefore observed as an independent 
unit (Verbeek, 2004). This section will cover the approach of econometric testing with the 
several procedures. Starting with a further explanation of the panel data model. 
Panel data specification: 
Yit = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽′Xit + εit 
The outcome variable will be number of employed persons in private firms per capita of 
China’s provinces. The main independent variables are broader property rights and 
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intellectual property rights in lagged values. These will be estimated separately first and 
combined to compare any possible variation. The control variables covered in the vector of 
Xit are; human capital, GDP growth, lawyers, freight traffic, total loans in financial 
institutions, total patents granted and number of state-owned enterprises. The Alpha covers 
provincial fixed-effects which are constant over time and the error term is assumed to be 
normal and identically distributed over individuals and time and thus assumed to have 
properties as constant variance and mean zero. Since the panel data will treat alpha as a 
parameter with fixed unknown numbers, the model will be estimated as a fixed effect model. 
Further implies that the dependent variable is affected by the specific provincial 
characteristics as well, E{yit|xit, αi} = xitβ + αi (Verbeek, 2004).  
A suspected reversed causality will not be examined as the independent variables of property 
rights are derived in lagged values and so the time dimension is not a fit for estimating a 
reversed causality. Dynamic panel data will not be covered in this thesis as adding 
endogeneity in the equation is subject to endogeneity bias unless correctly specified with 
number of lags to avoid correlation with the error term. Receiving endogeneity bias is of a 
higher risk within shorter panel data and was the result of adding one lag of the dependent 
variable. Adding more lags does not make more theoretical sense, implying that the size of 
private sector would depend on the size of the private sector of more than 2 years ago, rather 
than be affected by various policies and geographical differences of China. Lastly, several 
robustness checks will be performed. Since there were few missing observations of lawyers 
for province, Hebei, 2005 till 2007, extrapolation was conducted to approximately find values 
for these years. However, the uncertainty is even higher since extrapolation was performed 
on each forecasted value and hence increases the risk of wrong approximated values. 
Therefore, Hebei will also be excluded from the sample as a robustness check.  
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
   This section will provide an overview of statistics used in the dataset, which contains 275 
observations over the years of 1997-2007 of Chinese provinces. The descriptive statistics is 
displayed in table 1 below. The variables are derived per 10 000 capita. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable      
Private Sector per Capita 275 315,6255 234,7057 14,2 1373,6 
Main Independent Variables      
PR 275 3,708764 1,976014 -0,46 10 
IPR 275 3,289164 5,126637 -0,24 40,47 
Control Variables      
Human capital per capita 275 35,26247 28,93692 0,82 147,23 
GDP per capita 275 126,0049 101,8515 22,34699 605,4502 
Freight traffic per capita 275 14,25648 8,280983 3,325189 45,72998 
Lawyers per capita 275 1,143854 1,137156 0,1594649 9,185561 
Loans in Financial institutions per capita 275 146,433 189.788 21,129 1521,917 
Patents per capita 275 1,339042 2,536105 0,0934603 22,87518 
SOE per capita 275 0,380306 0,4586517 0,0031285 3,495161 
 
From table 1, the variety of provincial differences is indicated by the sample minimum and 
sample maximum values. The variety is high for most variables. Interesting point is the high 
variety of the proportion of the private sector across the provinces, taking values from 14,2 
employed people in the private sector per 10 000 capita to 1373 per 10 000 capita and further 
emphasises a skewed development of the private sector among the provinces. IPR has a high 
disparity too, from -0,46 to a score of 40 and can be compared relatively across the provinces. 
To further illustrate the development of the employment, see figure 2. 
Figure 2. Employment within the private sector from 1997-2007. 
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Figure 2 above, is in line with the previous literature of China’s private sector growing since 
beginning of the 1990 (Zheng and Yang, 2009). In addition, amendment laws of IPR 
protection occurred around the millennium and may be correlated with the rapid development 
of the private sector which appear in the graph. A study concludes that the effect of property 
rights was more significant after 2002 when China admitted to several deregulations to meet 
WTO standards (Shi et al, 2017). The smaller decrease around 1999 might have occurred 
after the financial crisis 1997 in East Asia. As China had constrained financial markets the 
crisis had not as poor impact compared to other East Asian economies (China.org.cn, 2017a) 
The provinces which experienced most development are the following; Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang, while provinces as Hunan, Hebei and Jilin even decreased. 
The two provinces which barely made any progress and still sustain same proportion of size 
of the private sector is Guangdong and Heilongjiang. But overall, the peak years of private 
sector seems to be covered, where the Eastern provinces show most development (Chinese 
Provincial Yearbooks).  
Figure 3. Property rights development from 1997-2007. 
 
The relative development of broader property rights and intellectual property rights are 
displayed in figure 3 above. Some provinces even experienced a decrease of broader property 
rights. Most of the provinces have experienced a rapid development of IPR compared to 
broader property rights, indicating that IPR protection may be more of value for private firms 
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rights from 4 to 8 while the same development for IPR went from a score of 0.91 to 40 in ten 
years (Gang and Fan, 2009). 
Back to table 1, descriptive statistics, the other two variables which show among the highest 
variation is GDP levels and loans in financial institutions. From the whole sample, it is 
employment in private sector, IPR protection, GDP and loans in financial institutions that 
varies the most among provinces. These are the four indicators from the sample, that seem to 
be the most relevant determinants. Human capital endures a high variety as well among the 
provinces, measuring student enrolments within higher institutions. Since the disparity is high 
for every variable, logarithmic transformation will be used to transform all variables as to 
achieve a more normal distribution. The exception is for the property rights indexes which 
take negative values and so logarithmic transformation is not possible. 
Next step is to examine collinearity among the variables. This is crucial to deal with possible 
multicollinearity issue. If there exists a high correlation, it will result in high standard errors 
and unreliable parameters which may bring wrong interference (Verbeek, 2004). A 
multicollinearity test is conducted and the VIF-values confirms no concern of severe 
multicollinearity. The correlation matrix and a VIF table can be found in Appendix, table A 
respective table B. The higher correlation is among the control variables which are less of a 
concern rather than the case of high collinearity among the independent variables which are 
both much lower than the control variables (O’Brien, 2007; Allison, 2012). The control 
variables may show higher correlation as they indirectly move towards the same direction as 
economic development. The highest VIF values concerned 3 variables; GDP, human capital 
and total loans in financial institutions. The result of dropping each of these variables, which 
may be found in table D, did not much affect the main result. In China, these 3 variables are 
relevant as they differ a lot between provinces and it still make theoretical sense to include 
them. 
3.3.2 Unit root test 
   It is reasonably to suspect the included variables of being trending and growing over time 
which results in nonstationary series. Therefore, unit root tests are conducted by Lewin-Lin-
Chu, LLC test. Since the provinces are suspected to be highly different from each other it 
may impose heterogeneity in the panel data. This stresses the importance of having stationary 
data. Further, the issue of several unit root tests for panel data concerns the hypothesis of 
having nonstationary while the opposite hypothesis of stationarity is enough to accept if one 
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individual in the sample is significant. Thus, the test may result in accepting stationarity 
while it in practice does not apply to all the provinces in the sample. (Verbeek, 2004). Since 
the LLC tests have a common autoregressive (AR) parameter it implies for all panels to be 
treated homogeneously, as a panel either contain or do not contain a unit root for a specific 
variable. The result of the test shows that all variables are stationary except human capital 
and so this variable needs further transformation such as first difference. Testing human 
capital again with first differences confirms stationarity. 
The equations for the final model: 
(1) ln Private Sectorit =αi + β1 Broader Property rights t-1 + β2 ln X’it +β3Δ ln (Human 
capital) it + εit 
(2) ln Private Sectorit =αi + β1Intellectual Property rights t-1 + β2 ln X’it +β3Δ ln (Human 
capital) it + εit 
(3) ln Private Sectorit =αi + β1 Broader Property rights t-1 + β2 Intellectual Property rights 
t-1 + β3 ln X’it + β4Δ ln (Human capital) it + εit 
All variables are in logarithmic values except the property rights indexes which are 
transformed into lagged values. Human Capital is the only variable transformed into first 
differences. 
4. Results 
4.1 Benchmark Results 
   This chapter will discuss the results of the final model outlined in previous chapter 
followed by several robustness tests. Table 2 below, presents the results from the final model. 
The first two models are separated with each property rights variable and the third model 
combines them. The results from separating or combining the property rights do not differ 
much and can be seen below in table 2. 
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4.1 Table. 2 Benchmark Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Private Sector Private Sector Private Sector 
    
Broader Property rights t-1 0.0194  0.00291 
 (0.0205)  (0.0176) 
Intellectual Property rights t-1 
 
 0.0339*** 
(0.00567) 
0.0334*** 
(0.00669) 
 
Human Capital       -0.429**    -0.363* -0.367* 
 (0.200) (0.201) (0.212) 
GDP 0.647* 0.646** 0.645** 
 (0.314) (0.311) (0.309) 
Freight Traffic -0.700 -0.703 -0.702 
 (0.472) (0.477) (0.475) 
Lawyers 0.164 0.118 0.117 
 (0.179) (0.176) (0.174) 
Loans.Fin 0.297 0.274 0.270 
 (0.241) (0.225) (0.225) 
Patents 0.0819 -0.0216 -0.0210 
 (0.0829) (0.0701) (0.0707) 
State-owned Enterprises -0.00617 -0.0166 -0.0173 
 (0.0212) (0.0228) (0.0232) 
Constant 4.262*** 4.179*** 4.175*** 
 (0.785) (0.757) (0.759) 
    
Observations 250 250 250 
R-squared 0.440 0.480 0.480 
Number of Provinces 25 25 25 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The benchmarks results, table 2, shows that intellectual property rights are highly positively 
correlated with the size of the private sector. One increase of a score of intellectual property 
rights increases the employment within the private sector on average with 0,033 percent. 
Contrary, broader property rights are not significant at all. It implies that the protection of 
intellectual property rights is more of a concern for the private sector than broader property 
rights. It further explains why there has been a rapid development of the protection of 
intellectual property rights compared to broader property rights, which have stayed at similar 
levels over the years studied. In addition, the panel data covers the years when many 
regulations of trademark, copyright and a Patent Law were enacted and shows a positive 
result for the employment of the private sector. However, the Property rights Law was first 
enacted 2007. The first hypothesis may not be significant as, even previous research has 
stated, the economic decentralisation and the sub-national institutions may be a recipe for 
handling ambiguous property rights. This implies that combatting obstacles of property rights 
is possible to work around with informal norms, while the same does not apply with 
intellectual property rights. IPR receives a more imperative status and the second hypothesis 
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is accepted by the conducted fixed effect model. IPR is crucial and is of a higher value to 
private firms as they have incentives to innovate and are in more need of protection from 
expropriation rather than state-owned firms (Wei et al, 2016).  
Although the control variables are not of interest, the one interesting significant finding is 
human capital which is negatively correlated with an increase of the private sector. This 
variable is transformed into first differences and so is interpreted as a growth rate rather than 
levels. Human capital measures student enrolments of higher institutions, and these highly 
skilled students are more likely to work for the government of China (Nee and Opper, 2012). 
The finding is that growth of the student enrolments decreases on average the private sector 
with 0,36 percent. Further implies that the employed persons of private sector in China 
probably do not have higher education than secondary school. Another significant finding is 
GDP. It confirms that economic development and increase of protection of IPR are connected 
and as moving towards the same direction they have positive effect on employment. 
4.2 Robustness Tests  
   Following robustness tests will subgroup various provinces by different criteria’s, based on 
geographical and institutional factors, which are the two main factors dividing China’s 
provincial development as most. One of the robustness tests with Hebei excluded from the 
sample may be found in the appendix, table C. A regressed panel data, table D may be found 
in the appendix, which contains regression without the 3 variables with highest correlation, to 
further prove the main result still holds for the main variables. 
4.2.1 Subgroup by West and East China 
   As previously mentioned, China suffers from high inequality. The inequality is both within 
provinces and among the provinces, but the trend of increasing inequality is significant across 
provinces more than within provinces (Ying, 1999). Moreover, the inequality among Eastern 
provinces compared to Western provinces is more pronounced than the North and South 
inequality, in terms of private firm development (Wang Q, et al, 2011). The exact 
categorisation of West and East may be found in appendix, table E. The 25 provinces studied 
are equally distributed where West contains 13 provinces and East covers 12 provinces. 
The positive attitude towards marketisation and development of a non-state sector is more 
pronounced along the coastal area covering provinces as; Shanghai, Tianjin, Zhejiang and 
Guangdong which are some of the coastal provinces which experiences a very high 
development of marketisation. Contrary, the Western, inland provinces have received very 
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little attention for developing marketisation and is relatively underdeveloped. The business 
environment is less attractive for private enterprises (Wang Q, et al, 2011). During the 90’s, 
the inequality between East and West became more significant than the inequality of North 
and South China (Ying, 1999). The coastal provinces belong as well to the top innovative 
provinces and stand for more than half of the total patents applications during the 90’s (Sun, 
2000). This might hint that the Eastern provinces enjoy improved protection of property 
rights more than the Western provinces, as data show faster development of both 
marketisation and rapid development of patents applied and granted. The subgrouping 
between West and East rather than the North and South seems more convincing in the study 
of the private sector.  
Table 3. Estimation Results of Subgrouping West and East 
 WEST EAST 
VARIABLES Private Sector Private Sector 
   
Broader Property rights t-1 0.00260 0.00311 
 (0.0135) (0.0274) 
Intellectual Property rights t-1 -0.0384 0.0423** 
 (0.0359) (0.0121) 
Human Capital -0.364** -0.0384 
 (0.164) (0.520) 
GDP 0.327 -0.286 
 (0.300) (0.349) 
Freight traffic -0.214 -0.575* 
 (0.343) (0.317) 
Lawyers -0.0899 0.785* 
 (0.0780) (0.416) 
Loans.Fin 0.421* 0.234 
 (0.225) (0.185) 
Patents -0.114 0.177 
 (0.0948) (0.120) 
State-owned Enterprises 0.000617 -0.0388 
 (0.0272) (0.0254) 
Constant 6.935*** 7.972*** 
 (0.825) (0.735) 
Observations 130 120 
R-squared 0.613 0.499 
Number of Provinces 13 12 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results from table 3 shows that after subgrouping by East and West, broader property 
rights are still insignificant which confirms that these property rights are not correlated with 
size of the private sector in China. Intellectual property rights hold for the Eastern provinces 
but with a decreased significance level, from 1 to 5 percent, which means after subgrouping 
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some effect is fading. For the Western provinces, IPR is insignificant which may be 
explained as the Western provinces sustain a larger proportion of a state-sector. Their smaller 
private sector may not produce high-technology goods and therefore the importance of 
increasing protection of IPR is reduced, compared to the competition many coastal provinces 
are experiencing which pushes for technology advancement. The courts specialised in 
disputes of intellectual property rights are all located in Eastern provinces. This might hint 
that protection of IPR is more demanded within the Eastern provinces which still sustain a 
larger employment within the private sector. Looking at the data of property rights, the only 
considerable increase of IPR for a Western province is Chongqing. In addition, many of the 
Western provinces receives a decreasing broader property rights development. Contrary, for 
the Eastern provinces, there are several provinces which have considerably high increase of 
both property rights measures (Gang and Fan, 2009). This is in line with the theory that 
private property rights are essential for market economies with incentives for investing in 
technology development which is the approach coastal provinces have obtained.  
Other significant findings for the coastal provinces are positive correlation of lawyers and 
negative correlation of freight traffic. Freight traffic is negatively correlated, which may 
imply that the use of freight traffic is mostly for the state-owned firms. Further, may pinpoint 
that private firms are smaller and their production is towards local markets.  
For the Western provinces, the significant findings are human capital and total loans in 
financial institutions. The negative correlation between human capital and the private sector 
seems to slightly increase as the proportion of state sector is higher, while total loans in 
financial institutions is positively correlated with size of private sector. Previous studies have 
mentioned, developing financial institutions are vital for economic development and may 
explain why the Western provinces show this effect. 
4.2.2 Excluding Municipalities 
   China has a very complex geography of developed and relatively underdeveloped 
provinces. China has furthermore provinces with an autonomous status or special economic 
zones. Therefore, there are more interesting robustness checks to conduct. Starting with the 
four municipalities which are cities but with an equal status of a province. These four 
municipalities are under direct administration of the central government. The four 
municipalities with a provincial status are following; Beijing Tianjin, Shanghai and 
Chongqing (China.org.cn, 2017b). The IPR courts within the four municipalities are more 
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efficient as they are separated from more autonomous local governments that may 
incorporate with rent-seeking such as ambiguous property rights (Huang et al, 2017). The 
municipalities are assumed to have an efficient governance of property rights protection. 
Table 4. Estimation results with Municipalities excluded 
VARIABLES Private Sector 
  
Broader Property rights t-1 -0.00741 
 (0.0126) 
Intellectual Property rights t-1 0.0142 
 (0.0142) 
Human Capital -0.337 
 (0.208) 
GDP -0.0119 
 (0.298) 
Freight traffic 0.506 
 (0.459) 
Lawyers -0.111 
 (0.108) 
Loans.Fin 0.162 
 (0.127) 
Patents -0.0600 
 (0.125) 
State-owned Enterprises -0.00390 
 (0.0247) 
Constant 5.224*** 
 (1.164) 
Observations 210 
R-squared 
Number of Provinces  
0.374 
21 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The estimation results from table 4 show no significant findings. The four municipalities are 
in first place driving the IPR effect, the employment of the private sector is responding to 
increasing protection of IRR. Another reason ought to be that China attracts foreign investors 
in Beijing and Shanghai and due to external demand for an improved protection the pressure 
for an efficient legal system occur. However, a large employment of the private sector is still 
considerable in Zhejiang and Guangdong with firms as Alibaba, Tencent and Huawei. Either 
the sample cannot capture this effect or because elsewhere in China, the production is not as 
high-tech or weakly enforced that substitutive alternatives are more reliable. The next 
robustness test will exclude the special economic zones where a large private sector is still 
existing. 
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4.2.3 Excluding Special Economic Zones 
   The special economic zones in China is a result of a gradual experiment of opening up 
towards implementing market policies in order to achieve economic development without 
risking social instability of rapid change. The special economic zones in China are Fujian and 
Guangdong and the attitudes toward privatisation have been liberalised. Moreover, during the 
90’s, the Pudong New Area in Shanghai received similar status and has received even more 
ambitious policies towards marketisation compared to Fujian and Guangdong which were the 
two first experiments (Ge, 1999). Provinces with more marketisation ought to promote 
improved property rights protection. Thus, the robustness test first excludes Fujian and 
Guangdong followed by excluding Shanghai in addition, to compose an interesting 
comparison. 
Table 5. Estimation Results excluding the Special Economic Zones 
 Excluding 
SEZ 
Excluding 
Shanghai 
VARIABLES Private Sector Private Sector 
   
Broader Property rights t-1 -0.00619 -0.0219 
 (0.0158) (0.0162) 
Intellectual Property rights t-1 0.0317** 0.0290 
 (0.00793) (0.0167) 
Human Capital -0.355 -0.367 
 (0.221) (0.225) 
GDP -0.153 -0.0957 
 (0.264) (0.259) 
Freight traffic -0.694 -0.739* 
 (0.410) (0.406) 
Lawyers -0.0354 -0.0136 
 (0.126) (0.126) 
Loans.Fin 0.921*** 0.902*** 
 (0.281) (0.278) 
Patents -0.0487 -0.0612 
 (0.110) (0.117) 
State-owned Enterprises -0.0118 -0.00437 
 (0.0202) (0.0208) 
Constant 8.237*** 8.379*** 
 (1.002) (0.982) 
   
Observations 230 220 
R-squared 0.501 0.474 
Number of Provinces 23 22 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Even when special economic zones are excluded, the correlation of IPR still holds. The 
interesting finding is that intellectual property rights drops its significance first when 
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Shanghai is excluded as well. This implies that Shanghai holds most of the effect of the 
correlation between intellectual property rights on size of the private sector, which makes 
sense as Shanghai is one of the most developed cities in China as well as a financial and a 
business centre. Shanghai did experience the most rapid increase of IPR scores where even 
broader property rights doubled during the 10 years covered (Gang and Fan, 2009). It could 
be possible for a bias of Shanghai as the significance of IPR is fading once Shanghai is 
excluded and the evidence may be found in appendix table F, as excluding Shanghai from the 
whole sample still results with significance of IPR. Another interesting finding is the 
significance of loans in financial institutions for both models and is highly positively 
correlated. It might hint that financial markets are in progress for even allowing the private 
sector more credit and further providing investments.  
5. Conclusions  
   The results indicate that an increasing protection of IPR is correlated with the size of the 
private sector in China. The main result is that the effect of IPR is mostly pronounced within 
the four municipalities, which implies IPR cannot be substituted by other informal norms. 
The rest of the provinces covered may not experience IPR protection as essential, since many 
of the private firms are either smaller and produce only for local markets or they do not 
produce high-tech goods. The demand for increased protection is evidently in the four 
municipalities and complies with empirical evidence that IPR protection is necessary within 
more innovative economies (Lerner et al, 2016; Wei et al, 2016). The result confirms the 
second hypothesis partially as the Western provinces may not have the need of increasing 
IPR yet for their private sector. The weaker property rights regime in the West decreases 
incentives for innovation as innovation levels are clearly at forefront in the East. The 
protection of IPR must do more with choice of production rather than the size of the private 
sector.  
On basis of the data collection, broader property rights have barely experienced an 
improvement. As IPR protection is less necessary for many Chinese provinces and private 
firms, the same may be said for broader property rights. Many of the provinces may therefore 
work around property rights by informal norms. A further research, to conclude the necessity 
of IPR for smaller private firms would require a more detailed in-depth survey than the panel 
data performed in this thesis. For example, examining production choices and the degree of 
property rights protection. Worth mentioning is one of the limitations for analysing the 
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broader property rights during these years is that a Property rights Law was enacted 2007 
while protection of IPR were initiated as early as during 1980. These results are the opposite 
to some previous research that have found that broader property rights are equally important 
to intellectual property rights (Song et al, 2009; Eicher and Newiak, 2013). The difference of 
analysis is that this thesis is drawing conclusions based on the measure of Chinese reported 
property rights which differ from several of the previous papers mentioned, which are all 
using own instrument variables to measure property rights protection. Yet the conclusions of 
IPR are similar. Intellectual property rights protection is vital for market economies and less 
imperative for an institutional framework based on state allocation and possible 
infringements by the central government.  
Moreover, the property rights theory does not state in detail which component of the property 
rights are outweighing the others. It is outdated, as previous empirical evidence show patent 
protections is more important due to the signalling of competitiveness. In addition, the 
conducted panel data can confirm this as the measures of IPR covered patents; applied and 
patents granted. Less can be said about the effect of enforced copyrights, as they may have a 
minor devastating effect. Although property rights protection is a fundamental component, a 
lower protection does not necessarily impede size of the private sector. Lower barriers for 
copyrights and trademarks may as well encourage initiatives for entrepreneurs to mimic 
production, while protection of patents has a value of signalling competitiveness. Both the 
panel data conducted and previous literature, confirm that protecting a patent system is more 
important as the opposite do not encourage innovative activities. Moreover, this thesis cannot 
state what an efficient limit of protections are. Yet a clear remark is that an increase of the 
IPR protection would increase domestic private production and innovations, which may be 
evidently in the future as China tries to shift its economy.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A. Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
Table B. VIF Values 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
GDP 13,26 0,075406 
Loans.Fin 10,67 0,094172 
Humcap 4,61 0,217028 
Lawyers 4,27 0,234186 
Patents 4,07 0,245402 
Ftraffic 2,76 0,361962 
IPR 2,59 0,385706 
PR 1,64 0,61112 
SOE 1,32 0,759427 
Mean 
VIF 5,06 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Private Sector PR IPR Humcap GDP Ftraffic Lawyers Loans.Fin Patents SOE
Private Sector 1.0000
PR 0.4746 1.0000
IPR 0.6420 0.5519 1.0000
Humcap 0.5454 0.3668 0.5179 1.0000
GDP 0.7324 0.5249 0.6968 0.7593 1.0000
Ftraffic 0.5541 0.3617 0.4974 0.6467 0.7600 1.0000
Lawyers 0.5906 0.4799 0.5129 0.6322 0.7740 0.7100 1.0000
Loans.Fin 0.6782 0.5285 0.6637 0.8193 0.8292 0.7628 0.8346 1.0000
Patents 0.6702 0.5312 0.6946 0.7222 0.8330 0.6124 0.7220 0.7781 1.0000
SOE  -0.1404 0.0066  -0.1633  -0.1691  -0.1158 0.0847 0.1652 0.0009  -0.0757 1.0000
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Table C. Excluding Hebei from the sample 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Private Sector 
  
Broader Property rights t-1 0.0175 
 (0.0124) 
Intellectual Property rights t-1 0.0316*** 
 (0.00505) 
Human Capital -0.494** 
 (0.180) 
GDP 0.457 
 (0.286) 
Freight traffic -0.672* 
 (0.342) 
Lawyers 0.176 
 (0.149) 
Loans.Fin 0.252 
 (0.226) 
Patents -0.0961 
 (0.109) 
State-owned Enterprises -0.0204 
 (0.0215) 
Constant 8.075*** 
 (0.834) 
Observations 240 
R-squared 
Number of Provinces 
0.524 
24 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. GDP, Loans in Financial Institutions and Human capital excluded 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Private Sector Private Sector Private Sector 
    
Broader Property rights t-1 -0.000764 0.0115 0.00192 
 (0.0142) (0.0180) (0.0162) 
Intellectual Property rights t-1 0.0365*** 0.0378*** 0.0386*** 
 (0.00732) (0.00757) (0.00718) 
Human Capital -0.465** -0.323  
 (0.214) (0.210)  
Freight Traffic -0.322 -0.479 -0.500 
 (0.443) (0.462) (0.460) 
Lawyers 0.164 0.183 0.128 
 (0.202) (0.172) (0.169) 
Loans.Fin 0.368  0.230 
 (0.241)  (0.204) 
Patents -0.000576 -0.0595 -0.0828 
 (0.0980) (0.114) (0.117) 
State-owned Enterprises -0.0305 -0.0149 -0.0138 
 (0.0302) (0.0220) (0.0213) 
GDP  0.528* 0.390 
  (0.289) (0.303) 
Constant 7.284*** 7.605*** 7.627*** 
 (1.109) (1.122) (1.119) 
Observations 250 250 250 
R-squared 0.427 0.422 0.429 
Number of Provinces 25 25 25 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E. Western and Eastern provinces 
West East 
Shanxi Beijing 
Anhui Tianjin 
Jiangxi Hebei 
Henan Liaoning 
Hubei Jilin 
Hunan Heilongjiang 
Chongqing Shanghai 
Sichuan Jiangsu 
Guizhou Zhejiang 
Yunnan Fujian 
Qinghai Shandong 
Ningxia Guangdong 
Xinjiang 
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Table F. Excluding Shanghai from the sample 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Private Sector 
  
Broader Property rights t-1 -0.00138 
 (0.0162) 
Intellectual Property rights t-1 0.0395* 
 (0.0148) 
Human Capital -0.371* 
 (0.216) 
GDP 0.363 
 (0.305) 
Freight traffic -0.556 
 (0.442) 
Lawyers 0.158 
 (0.165) 
Loans.Fin 0.234 
 (0.199) 
Patents -0.0811 
 (0.121) 
State-owned Enterprises -0.0107 
 (0.0238) 
Constant 7.844*** 
 (1.074) 
Observations 240 
R-squared 
Number of Provinces 
0.415 
24 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
